w-screenctl @1.0.7
Vulnerability report · Last retrieved from osv.dev August 8, 2026 at 12:14 AM UTC
OSV ID
MAL-2026-13618
Ecosystem
npm
Summary
When WScreenctl() is invoked (via the bundled g.mjs entry or the documented systemd/Task Scheduler service units), the package starts a Hapi HTTP server bound to 0.0.0.0:7000 with CORS enabled and no authentication. POST /chrome/evaluate passes the request body's script field directly to Playwright's page.evaluate, allowing arbitrary JavaScript execution inside the controlled Chrome instance. POST /keyboard/type, /keyboard/key, and /mouse/* forward HTTP-supplied text, key names, and coordinates into xdotool or w-mousekey/AHK, driving system-wide keyboard and mouse input on the host desktop. Because the listener binds to all interfaces with no credential check, any party reachable on the network — LAN, adjacent VLAN, or an internet-routable interface — can execute JavaScript in the browser session and drive arbitrary keystrokes and clicks on the operator's machine, which can be used to open a terminal, type shell commands, and achieve full host RCE. The dist bundle also contains child_process usage tied to ping and POST primitives consistent with this HTTP dispatch surface.
Source: amazon-inspector (3b2f241eacc2eaaaac28d2b9d76aeb67042a109869b28e45a88648bf937f856f)
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