snavbox @1.0.2

Summary

At CLI startup, index.js downloads three native shared libraries (sbx.so, bot.so, v1.so) from https://${arch}.31888.xyz/ (amd64.31888.xyz, arm64.31888.xyz), writes them to disk, and loads them via koffi.load() to invoke native functions from the fetched bytes. The download URL is not version-pinned, the domain is unrelated to the package publisher, and the downloadLibrary(url, fileName, expectedSha256) helper treats an empty expectedSha256 as a pass, so no integrity check is performed. Package metadata describes the project as "WildGuard - Protect Our Wildlife" with an accompanying wildlife-themed index.html, but the actual code implements a sing-box multi-protocol proxy (vless/vmess/trojan/hysteria2/tuic/reality/anytls), a Cloudflare Argo tunnel configured with noTLSVerify: true, a Nezha remote-management agent, and a hardcoded keep-alive callback to https://keep.gvrander.eu.org/add-url. Multiple execSync('curl...') invocations are also present. The mismatch between the advertised purpose and the shipped behavior, combined with the unpinned unverified native-code fetch from a non-publisher host, gives the operator of 31888.xyz arbitrary code execution on any host that runs this package.

Source: amazon-inspector (b5af4f54b61e8c07cb80d8f65c7ff554627597f600fe3b67094eb71097903548)