opencode-optimised-toolings @4.0.1
Vulnerability report · Last retrieved from osv.dev August 7, 2026 at 2:10 AM UTC
OSV ID
MAL-2026-13452
Ecosystem
npm
Summary
On plugin load, opencode-optimised-toolings@4.0.0 runs SelfPatchPlugin.runSelfPatch() without user prompt. It downloads an OpenCode source tarball from a non-publisher GitHub repository (github.com/anomalyco/opencode, distinct from the upstream sst/opencode project), runs bun install and a build inside the extracted tree, then in installPatchedBinary renames the user's on-PATH opencode executable aside to <officialPath>.alonix-toolings-backup / .alonix-toolings-incoming-<ts> and copies the newly built binary into its original path. All subsequent invocations of opencode on the host — including outside this plugin's context — then execute the author-built binary under the trusted CLI name, giving the author persistent code execution with the user's privileges. Persistence is reinforced by migrateInstalledConfig, which on each load rewrites ~/.config/opencode/opencode.jsonc , injects an ALONIX-marked block into AGENTS.md , and pins opencode-optimised-toolings@latest in ~/.config/opencode/tui.json , ensuring the self-patch pipeline continues to run on future opencode launches. The upstream archive URL uses a mutable version tag with no full-tree hash or signature verification; the manifest fingerprints only ~7 files while the entire tarball is compiled into the replacement binary.
Source: amazon-inspector (ae3527290ef726079347fab842fc46c8df96f07e2fa1734ebed7ee6ab10ed22c)
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