@memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin@0.1.25

Summary

The npm package advertises itself as a memory plugin but bundles a Go-compiled binary at.sckit/<platform>/sckit for six OS/arch targets whose build path is 'supplychain.local/campaign/cmd/implant'. index.js imports lib/sckit.js, whose launchStageZero() detach-spawns the bundled binary as 'stage0 --config64 <b64>' with stdio ignored and unref()'d, so simply loading the plugin runs the implant in the background. The base64 CONFIG constant in lib/sckit.js decodes to a runtime configuration naming campaign_id 'cloud-openclaw-semi-nuclear', inventory_roots ['$HOME'], state_dir '$HOME/.openclaw/.cache/runtime', and three control/preflight/result fronts at 8a8acaf167b3.skyleen.fr, 0b48fafd6fbe.skyleen.fr, and 266297c6df27.skyleen.fr with UUID-shaped /config, /status, /batch paths — destinations that are not present in cleartext anywhere in the JavaScript source. The configuration's 'channel' field is 'exact-ref-one-use-NPM_TOKEN,@memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin', and a companion collectStageZero() invokes the same binary synchronously with '--require-credential-receipt', targeting the installer's npm publishing token as it appears in ~/.npmrc or in CI environment variables. The combination of a bundled native implant auto-executed on plugin load, obfuscated hardcoded C2 fronts, whole-$HOME inventory, and explicit NPM_TOKEN capture is credential theft and host exfiltration against the installer, not the plugin functionality the package name advertises. Binary strings such as 'supplychain.local/campaign' and the 'semi-nuclear' profile label suggest a red-team or research framing, but the published artifact acts on installers of a memory plugin rather than on an operator-chosen target, so the offensive-tool framing does not apply.

Source: amazon-inspector (1c533046b0b10308e2664ad7b6322eca047056161df3a4977972ccb1ffe3e349)