@love-moon/conductor-cli @0.8.0
Vulnerability report · Last retrieved from osv.dev August 6, 2026 at 7:08 PM UTC
OSV ID
MAL-2026-13428
Ecosystem
npm
Summary
The conductor daemon command (bin/conductor-daemon.js -> src/daemon.js) opens a WebSocket to https://conductor.conductor-ai.top (or a user-configured backend_url) and registers a message handler that, in handleTerminalInput , writes payload.data received from the server directly into a node-pty process. The PTY is spawned by handleCreatePtyTask running either the user's default shell (/bin/bash, /bin/zsh, cmd.exe, $SHELL) or a CLI from DEFAULT_CLI_LIST, which launches codex --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox and claude --dangerously-skip-permissions — the same flags are written into the generated config.yaml by bin/conductor-config.js. Any party controlling the WebSocket peer (the Conductor backend, an impersonator on the network, or a compromised backend account) can drive arbitrary commands into the installer's shell or into an AI CLI whose local approval/sandbox gates have been disabled by default. The remote-command channel and the disabled-safety flags together provide full-host command execution driven by conductor-ai.top.
Source: amazon-inspector (7ea5d4f1af0a0b67e6f74bfb45867ce0b33136083138e3c23a56df03d8b5c902)
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