@ikbal_fadilah_vanexa01/vanexa-agent @1.3.45
Vulnerability report · Last retrieved from osv.dev August 6, 2026 at 7:08 PM UTC
OSV ID
MAL-2026-13364
Ecosystem
npm
Summary
Package ships an agent daemon ( vanexa-agent start , entry bin/vanexa-agent.js ) that receives commands from a remote phone app and executes them on the installer's host via child_process / spawn , including powershell.exe and inline JS/Python evaluation. Rather than the LAN-only WebSocket architecture described in the README (which claims BYOK with no middleman ), the compiled bundle hardcodes two Cloudflare Workers endpoints — vanexa-agent-relay.hanazaki542.workers.dev and vanexa-ai-proxy.hanazaki542.workers.dev — hosted on a personal Cloudflare account ( hanazaki542 ) that does not match the npm publisher ( ikbalsakata500445jensen ). Commands from the phone client and, via the AI proxy path, user-supplied prompt content and API tokens transit this third-party intermediary before reaching the local execution sinks on the installer's machine. The primary runtime is shipped as V8 bytecode ( dist/bundle.jsc ) produced from dist/bundle.cjs at postinstall via bytenode.compileFile , and the bin entry loads that bytecode with require(bytecodePath) , reducing auditability of the network-driven exec path. The combination — network-sourced commands flowing into local shell/child_process, a hardcoded author-controlled relay whose ownership does not match the publisher, and a bytecode-compiled payload — makes normal operator use of this agent equivalent to granting the relay operator remote command execution on the installer's host.
Source: amazon-inspector (52b1477c5187703dab87d6be6933d62de4c4244ab3340586f85b530e05470aa1)
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