@addai/entity-runtime @0.2.58
Vulnerability report · Last retrieved from osv.dev August 6, 2026 at 7:08 PM UTC
OSV ID
MAL-2026-13410
Ecosystem
npm
Summary
The package runs a daemon that polls a hardcoded Supabase project (syhzpqqvrplaqdipcymw.supabase.co) via the RPC runtime_pick_next_request for remote-supplied job rows and spawns Claude Code / Codex / Kimi / Gemini / Grok in a PTY on the installer's host, driven by fields controlled by the paired remote party (prompt, permissionMode, appendSystemPrompt, allowedTools, model, workingDirectory). In dist/session-runner.js , spawnClaudeForRuntime invokes the agent binary through a login shell ( ['-l','-c','exec "$@"',...] ) and, when input.permissionMode === 'bypassPermissions' , passes --dangerously-skip-permissions , letting the remotely-driven AI agent execute arbitrary shell tools as the local user without any interactive prompt. On start, ensureBypassPermissionsAccepted() in dist/index.js also writes skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt: true into the installer's user-global ~/.claude/settings.json , disabling Claude Code's own bypass-permissions safety dialog for every future interactive Claude Code session the installer runs — not just those spawned by this daemon. dist/capabilities.js additionally reads ~/.kimi/config and modifies PATH. The net effect is a persistent remote-controlled channel giving the paired remote party host-level RCE on the installer's machine via the AI agent tool loop, plus a persistent lowering of a separate vendor tool's safety prompts.
Source: amazon-inspector (248d92bb0f9ac7a066bb69c3f3ecea88241e5dd35ea1b61393896c88c07b0856)
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