Security changelog

Impact

useHeadSafe restricts head input to an allowlist of safe tags and attributes. For example, bodyAttrs is limited to class and style, event handler attributes are removed, and <script> tags are only kept for JSON types.

When useHeadSafe is called inside a server island (a .server.vue component or page, or a component rendered with <NuxtIsland>), the island renderer serialises the raw input of every head entry into the island response without the option that marks it as safe input.

Impact

An application that renders <NuxtLink :to="..."> with a value it does not control can be made to render an anchor whose href executes script in the application’s origin when clicked.

This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-934w-87qh-qr26 (CVE-2026-53722). It only affects applications running without a pages/ directory, where pages resolves to false and Nuxt registers its own router in place of vue-router.

Summary

Nuxt compared routeRules keys against the raw request path, without decoding percent-encoding, while the router decodes parameters when it resolves a route. A request whose path is percent-encoded can therefore resolve to a page while failing to match the route rule meant to protect it, so the rule’s appMiddleware never runs, including during server rendering.

Impact

With the default router.options.sensitive: false, Nuxt’s page router resolves routes case-insensitively, so /Admin renders the same page as /admin. On the server, however, route rules were resolved with Nitro’s route-rule matcher, which matches keys case-sensitively. A request whose path differs from a rule key only in letter case therefore rendered the page with none of that rule applied.

Impact

When a Nuxt dev server is bound to a network-reachable interface (for example nuxt dev --host for on-device testing), the default-enabled Chrome DevTools workspace endpoint GET /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json returns the absolute project root (workspace.root, i.e. rootDir) and a persistent per-project workspace UUID.

Impact

Nuxt matches route rules case-insensitively by default (mirroring vue-router’s default sensitive: false routing). The fix for GHSA-mm7m-92g8-7m47 / CVE-2026-53721 lowercased the lookup path before matching route rules, but the route-rule keys compiled into the matcher were left verbatim.

Impact

When a page is covered by routeRules cache / swr / isr, Nuxt enables runtime payload extraction and serves /<page>/_payload.json. On affected versions the renderer stored the SSR payload in the shared cache:nuxt:payload storage under a path-only key (no cookie, authorization, or cache.varies dimension) and, on a later payload request, returned the cached entry before route middleware / page guards ran again.

Impact

The internal island renderer endpoint (/__nuxt_island/...) decodes and hashes attacker-controlled request input before it validates the URL-resident hash. An unauthenticated POST /__nuxt_island/<name>_<anything>.json with a large JSON body (for example ~4.6 MB / 150k keys) is fully read, destr-parsed, and run through ohash before the request is rejected with a 400. Because Nitro runs on a single event loop, this both wastes CPU on the doomed request and delays every concurrent request.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can crash a Nuxt server that renders any island / server component containing a v-for over a prop (for example v-for="n in count" or a <slot v-for>). Because the island URL hash is a non-secret digest of the request, the attacker can compute a valid hash for arbitrary props and send the iterated prop as a large integer. The server then expands the v-for to that many nodes during SSR, allocating memory proportional to the attacker’s number.

Impact

Nuxt server islands accept props via the /__nuxt_island/ endpoint. When an application has a server island component that forwards props directly into Vue’s dynamic component resolution (<component :is>, resolveDynamicComponent, or h()), an attacker can pass a plain string value (rather than a component definition) to instantiate any globally-registered Vue component or any native HTML element.

For example:

{ "as": "SomeGlobalComponent" }

Impact

Nuxt’s globally registered <NoScript> component (from @unhead/vue head components, re-exported by Nuxt) wrote its default-slot content to the innerHTML of the <noscript> head tag, bypassing the HTML escaping that {{ }} interpolation normally applies in Vue templates.

Applications that placed untrusted, attacker-controllable data inside a <NoScript> slot, for example:

<NoScript>{{ route.query.banner }}</NoScript>

Impact

When running nuxt dev on Linux (Node.js 20+, outside Docker / StackBlitz), Nuxt’s internal vite-node IPC server binds to a Linux abstract-namespace Unix socket (\0nuxt-vite-node-<pid>-<ts>.sock). Abstract sockets have no filesystem inode and therefore no permission bits: any local UID on the host that can read /proc/net/unix can enumerate the socket and connect to it.

The IPC server does not perform any peer-credential or shared-secret check before dispatching requests.

Summary

<NuxtLink> did not validate the URL scheme of values bound to its to or href props before rendering them into the href attribute of the underlying <a> element. When an application binds attacker-controlled input (a query parameter, a CMS field, a user-supplied profile URL) to <NuxtLink :to> or :href, the attacker can supply a javascript: or vbscript: URL that is reflected verbatim into the rendered markup.

Impact

Nuxt looks up routeRules for the current navigation by calling getRouteRules({ path: to.path }) from the page-router plugin and the no-pages router plugin. The compiled routeRules matcher (built on rou3) performs case-sensitive matching, while vue-router is configured with its default sensitive: false and matches paths case-insensitively.

The two routers therefore disagree on which rules apply to a given request path: vue-router still matches the page record for

Summary

Three weaknesses in Nuxt’s client-navigation URL handling, all reachable from documented public APIs (navigateTo and reloadNuxtApp):

1. (CVE-2026-56326) SSR open redirect in navigateTo via path-normalisation bypass. navigateTo decided whether a target was external by inspecting the raw input with hasProtocol(..., { acceptRelative: true }). Inputs such as /..//evil.com, /.//evil.com, /%2e%2e//evil.com, or

Summary

When running nuxt dev, Nuxt registers an unauthenticated route at /.well-known/appspecific/com.chrome.devtools.json that returns the absolute filesystem path of the project root and a per-project UUID persisted to node_modules/.cache/nuxt/chrome-workspace.json. The route is enabled by default via experimental.chromeDevtoolsProjectSettings: true.

The endpoint exists to let Chrome DevTools’ Workspace integration map sources to the developer’s local checkout.

Summary

When experimental.componentIslands is enabled (default in Nuxt 4), any .server.vue file under pages/ is automatically registered as a server island under the key page_<routeName> and exposed via the /__nuxt_island/:name endpoint. Until this fix, requests through that endpoint rendered the page component directly via the SSR renderer without instantiating Vue Router, which meant route middleware declared on the page (including definePageMeta({ middleware })) did not run.

Summary

The /__nuxt_island/* endpoint accepts attacker-controlled props query/body parameters and renders any island component without verifying that the URL-resident hash (<Name>_<hashId>.json) was actually issued for those inputs by <NuxtIsland>. The hash is computed and embedded client-side but never validated server-side, so the same path can return materially different responses depending on the query.

Summary

navigateTo() with external: true generates a server-side HTML redirect body containing a <meta http-equiv="refresh"> tag. The destination URL is only sanitized by replacing " with %22, leaving <, >, &, and ' unencoded. An attacker who can influence the URL passed to navigateTo(url, { external: true }) can break out of the content="…" attribute and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes under the application’s origin.

Summary

A client-side path traversal vulnerability in Nuxt’s Island payload revival mechanism allowed attackers to manipulate client-side requests to different endpoints within the same application domain when specific prerendering conditions are met.

Technical Details

The vulnerability occurs in the client-side payload revival process (revive-payload.client.ts) where Nuxt Islands are automatically fetched when encountering serialized __nuxt_island objects. The issue affects the following flow:

Summary

By sending a crafted HTTP request to a server behind an CDN, it is possible in some circumstances to poison the CDN cache and highly impacts the availability of a site.

It is possible to craft a request, such as https://mysite.com/?/_payload.json which will be rendered as JSON. If the CDN in front of a Nuxt site ignores the query string when determining whether to cache a route, then this JSON response could be served to future visitors to the site.

Summary

The navigateTo function attempts to blockthe javascript: protocol, but does not correctly use API’s provided by unjs/ufo. This library also contains parsing discrepancies.

Details

The function first tests to see if the specified URL has a protocol. This uses the unjs/ufo package for URL parsing.

Summary

Due to the insufficient validation of the path parameter in the NuxtTestComponentWrapper, an attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript on the server side, which allows them to execute arbitrary commands.

Details

While running the test, a special component named NuxtTestComponentWrapper is available. https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/blob/4779f5906fa4d3c784c2e2d6fe5a5c5f181faaec/packages/nuxt/src/app/components/nuxt-root.vue#L42-L43

he Nuxt dev server between versions 3.4.0 and 3.4.3 is vulnerable to code injection when it is exposed publicly.