@solana-labs/web3js@1.98.112

Summary

Package name @solana-labs/web3js closely resembles the well-known @solana/web3.js library (different scope, missing dot in module name). The bundled lib/index.cjs.js and lib/index.esm.js are large minified blobs that include require('child_process'), fetch(, POST, curl, and ping strings, but the bundle is consistent in shape with a Solana web3 client SDK (RPC client, websocket subscriptions, JSON-RPC POST calls to user-configured endpoints). The keyword co-occurrence in a minified rollup bundle does not by itself confirm exfiltration: a JSON-RPC client legitimately POSTs to caller-supplied RPC URLs, and child_process references can come from bundled diagnostics or test utilities pulled into the rollup. No lifecycle script, top-level network beacon, or hardcoded attacker endpoint has been confirmed in the traced code. The primary concern is name/scope confusion against the official @solana/web3.js package, which carries real installer risk if developers select the wrong dependency. Routing to human review to (a) confirm whether the scope @solana-labs is an official Solana publisher or a lookalike, and (b) de-minify the relevant spans of the bundle to confirm the network calls are caller-configured RPC endpoints rather than a hardcoded C2.

Source: amazon-inspector (d9bcfcd3a9b7eb540a36cb0d90a75c1e0c94cb5e78e265a85539608e3503a214)