npm

@marketfront/gotoauthpopup @7.0.0

Vulnerability report · Last retrieved from osv.dev July 6, 2026 at 10:15 AM UTC

Malicious

OSV ID

MAL-2026-6781

Ecosystem

npm

Summary

@marketfront/gotoauthpopup@7.0.0 declares a postinstall hook (scripts.postinstall: 'node scripts/postinstall.js') that automatically runs on npm install. scripts/postinstall.js is a single ~165 KB obfuscator.io-style bundle: an RC4-decoded rotated string array, a self-defending IIFE, and a guard that inspects process.argv and process.env.NODE_OPTIONS for debugger/inspector markers plus a busy-loop timing check and only executes the payload when no debugger is detected. When the guard passes, the script harvests installer host identity (hostname, username, homedir, arch, cpus, platform, release, network interfaces), a bulk dump of process.env, Windows-specific env (USERDOMAIN, COMPUTERNAME, APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA, PROGRAMDATA, TEMP), enumerates the user's home directory via fs.readdirSync, and reads targeted config/credential files via fs.readFileSync. The collected data is RC4-encrypted and POSTed via https.request to a C2 host that is assembled at runtime from atob() fragments so the destination does not appear as a plaintext string in the source. A parallel covert channel base32-encodes the same ciphertext, splits it into ~50-character DNS labels, and issues dns.resolve4() queries against the same host used as the authoritative resolver, providing DNS-tunnel exfiltration to bypass HTTP egress filtering. The package additionally impersonates internal corporate infrastructure — repository github.marketfront.io, bugs jira.marketfront.io, homepage docs.marketfront.io, and README instructing developers to configure registry=https://npm.marketfront.io — a dependency-confusion cover story to induce installation of what appears to be an internal auth SDK. The declared main points at../src/index.js which is not shipped, so the package has no legitimate library functionality; its only on-install effect is the dropper. README framing of the postinstall as 'anonymous telemetry' does not apply — the behavior is bulk credential and configuration harvest with anti-analysis evasion and a covert side channel.

Source: amazon-inspector (108121fd7d553c24c0990884bc6854df559111a77ae72d65a311d6f74fde6954)

Protect your entire dependency tree

Scan your lock files automatically on every PR. Block malicious packages before they reach production.