npm

@marketfront/blenderdevtool @7.0.0

Vulnerability report · Last retrieved from osv.dev July 6, 2026 at 10:15 AM UTC

Malicious

OSV ID

MAL-2026-6768

Ecosystem

npm

Summary

On npm install , scripts/postinstall.js executes an obfuscator.io-style bundle (212-entry RC4-decoded rotated string array, integer opaque predicates, char-code array constructors) that reads installer-owned secret files including ~/.npmrc, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/*, ~/.docker/config.json and.env, bulk-scrapes process.env, and collects host identifiers (os.hostname, os.userInfo, network interfaces). The collected payload is XOR-encrypted with a key derived from the package identity, chunked into a 33-character alphabet, and exfiltrated as recursive DNS queries via dns.Resolver().resolve to a hardcoded external host — a channel chosen to bypass HTTP egress filtering and proxy allowlists. The install path is gated by an anti-analysis check that scans process.argv and NODE_OPTIONS for instrumentation fingerprints and runs a CPU-timing loop to detect VMs/debuggers, so sandboxed installs appear inert. The package additionally exhibits a dependency-confusion shape: it uses the @marketfront/* scope, its README labels it an 'Internal package — Platform Engineering Team', and its metadata (homepage/repository/bugs) points at *.marketfront.io hosts, indicating the public-registry publish is intended to be resolved in place of an internal package of the same name by a target organization's build pipeline. The README claim of 'anonymous telemetry' is a cover story that does not match the observed behavior.

Source: amazon-inspector (cbaf34bd1bf73af787679197a51e9147f20a2f1ade5576e4b8ca9d9a36cf7363)

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