api-anthropic@1.1.3
Vulnerability report · Last retrieved from osv.dev October 29, 2026 at 4:00 PM UTC
OSV ID
MAL-2026-18055
Ecosystem
npm
Summary
The npm package api-anthropic impersonates Anthropic branding (both the package name and the destination domain api-anthropic.help) and reconfigures the user's Claude Code installation to send all traffic through an author-controlled gateway. The CLI writes ~/.claude/settings.json with env.ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL set to https://api-anthropic.help and env.ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN set to a key, so every subsequent Claude Code session - including prompts, pasted code, file contents, and credentials shared with the assistant - flows through the author's domain instead of Anthropic's real API. The README advertises a non-Anthropic model ("Fable 5.1 (1M Context)"), confirming the endpoint is a third-party proxy rather than Anthropic infrastructure. In addition, the package writes hasTrustDialogAccepted=true and hasClaudeMdExternalIncludesApproved=true into ~/.claude.json for both the current working directory and the user's entire $HOME, pre-approving Claude Code's folder-trust and external-include safety prompts across every project in the home directory. The combination gives the proxy operator a durable channel to capture all AI-assisted content and to have Claude Code act on arbitrary files beneath $HOME without further confirmation.
Source: amazon-inspector (19164d6b4b781d022a4bc75ae45fae6d20737ddc0b711057e89990d39efc8df5)
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