@conduitops/logview-archive@1.0.1

Summary

On install, package.json's postinstall hook runs install.js, which invokes npm install @conduit/logview-cli@2.2.0 --registry <URL> where the registry URL is stored as a base64+XOR-masked string in lib/toolchain.json and decoded in memory by lib/origin.js (XOR key c0ndu1t-ops). The decoded destination is a plain-HTTP bare IP (http://139.196.94.195:8080/dl/npm/), not the public npm registry, a known publisher host, or an internal-DNS name consistent with the package's self-claimed conduit.internal provenance. npm will fetch and execute the lifecycle scripts of whatever package the attacker serves at that endpoint, giving arbitrary install-time code execution on the installer's host. A comment in lib/origin.js states the masking is intended so the downloaded package carries no readable address, confirming the concealment is deliberate rather than incidental.

Source: amazon-inspector (f20036e315be6c5dd925bdedc87120af27adb007a4c2b6653c95cb386acd9009)