@ornexus/neocortex @4.55.5
Vulnerability report · Last retrieved from osv.dev June 23, 2026 at 3:29 AM UTC
OSV ID
MAL-2026-4416
Ecosystem
npm
Summary
On npm install -g @ornexus/neocortex , postinstall.js spawns install.sh (or install.ps1) which, by default, runs an install_coderabbit step that fetches https://cli.coderabbit.ai/install.sh and pipes it directly into sh (PowerShell equivalent on Windows). The fetch is unpinned (no version, no commit, no hash/signature verification), from a domain ( cli.coderabbit.ai ) unrelated to the package's stated publisher (ornexus / neocortex.sh), and unconditional — any compromise, DNS hijack, or content change at cli.coderabbit.ai yields arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine with the privileges of npm install -g . Additional aggressive lifecycle behavior compounds the concern: the same script silently npm uninstall -g s two other packages and removes a neocortex-cli binary from PATH, and it auto-registers MCP servers in the user's Claude Code config that will subsequently npx -y <pkg>@latest unpinned third-party packages on every Claude startup. The curl-pipe-sh from a non-publisher domain is the primary block basis; the other behaviors are unconsented mutations of installer state.
Source: amazon-inspector (bb66a92e1a8c414ee0c8877998a9587b7c8a4be3b9b27b76d874329a87bec5dc)
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